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Among the Western critics of the West who frequently appear in and get quoted by the Kremlin-sponsored media,
the left-wing thinker Noam Chomsky clearly stands out. An internationally acclaimed MIT professor, the winner of
the 2005 Prospect/Foreign Policy Top 100 Public Intellectuals poll, a pundit whose foreign policy views are
discussed in high-level academic IR journals, Chomsky is head and shoulders above the numerous extreme,
marginal, ill-reputed activists who RT and Sputnik International present as ‘experts,’ – be it the editor of the
German neo-Nazi Zuerst magazine Manuel Ochsenreiter or the infamous conspiracy theorists William Engdahl
and Jeffrey Steinberg. Yet, the overwhelming majority of Chomsky’s comments, which appear in Kremlin-backed
media, predominantly concern the US and its allies rather than Russia. Their topics embrace the typical issues
which the left regularly criticizes as imperialist and inhumane: US military strategy and immigration policies, the
Iraqi war, Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds, Israeli policies in Palestine etc. What, however, remains
interesting—and infrequently discussed—is Chomsky’s view of the Putin regime itself.
Putin’s Early Years
In the beginning of Putin’s rule, Chomsky’s statements about Russia were mostly critical. At least partially, this
seems to have been inertial and influenced by the Russian government’s market reforms of the 1990s, of which
Chomsky had utterly disapproved. In his opinion, those ‘neoliberal’ ‘US-backed’ reforms killed ‘millions of
people’ throughout the post-Soviet space with ‘the mortality rate being akin to the results of Stalin’s purges’ (my
translation). Yet more notably, his critical attitude was caused by Russia’s support of the US-led coalition in
Afghanistan, which Chomsky used to attribute to the Kremlin’s own then-ongoing war in Chechnya:
Russia is happily joining the international coalition because it is delighted to have U.S. support for the horrendous
atrocities it is carrying out in its war against Chechnya. It describes that as an anti-terrorist war. In fact it is a
murderous terrorist war itself. They’d love to have the United States support it.
From 2004 onward, following Putin’s disagreement with the Iraq campaign, Chomsky started demonstrating more
sympathy to Moscow, considering Russia’s then-continuing increase of military exercises and military
expenditures as somewhat a reasonable ‘reaction to the Bush administration’s militancy and aggressiveness.’
One of his speeches of that period still contains a mention of ‘the collapse of the Russian economy under the
market fanaticism’ which, in his view, had engendered the deterioration of Russian nuclear weapons. Yet, given
the context, that remark reads as an expression of sorrow rather than a critical note. Incidentally, Chomsky’s
stance on the Chechen war also altered towards a more sympathetic one as the US bogged down more and more
in Iraq:
Let’s take the invasion of Iraq. Compare it to, say, Putin’s invasion of Chechnya. There are a lot of differences,
but let’s compare it. The Russians invaded Chechnya, destroyed Grozny, carried out massacres, terror. They
pacified it. C.J. Chivers of the New York Times was there a couple months ago to report that Grozny is now a
booming city, there is building all over, everybody has electricity run by Chechens, you don’t see Russian soldiers
around. Do we praise Putin for his achievement? No. In fact, we condemn him for it. I suppose that if Petraeus
could achieve even a fraction of what Putin achieved in Chechnya, he would be crowned king.
Notably, in this interview, Chomsky makes no allusion to numerous human rights abuses in Chechnya, references
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to which abound in Chivers’ article he cites.
International Crises Involving Russia
Since 2008, Chomsky have been mentioning Russia primarily in relation to the international crises, in which
Putin’s actions garnered worldwide media attention and were slammed by the West: the 2008 Russo-Georgian
war, the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and the 2016 meddling in the US presidential elections. What is conspicuously
similar in his comments on these events is a scarcity of remarks on the Russian actions as such. Chomsky seems
much more interested in citing the critical statements of mainstream Western pundits and politicians and then
refuting them, often ironically or sarcastically, on the grounds that the US commits much worse ‘crimes.’
Thus, in his 2008 article on the Georgian conflict, he referred, inter alia, to ‘a US-backed invasion’ of Israel into
Lebanon in 1982 ‘that left some 15-20,000 dead’ and ‘[t]he US-backed Krajina expulsion’ which, to his mind,
was ‘possibly the worst case of ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II.’ In Chomsky’s view, Moscow’s
primary weakness was that ‘Russia ha[d] “not yet learned how to play the media game,”’ as a result of which
‘[t]he Russian propaganda system made the mistake of presenting evidence, which was easily refuted.’
Similarly, Chomsky’s discussions of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are invariably accompanied with mentions of US
treatment of Cuba—specifically, the arguably unlawful retention of Guantanamo Bay—and the assertion that ‘the
U.S. carried out the worst crime of the century in the invasion of Iraq, much worse than anything Russia has
done.’ Commenting on US condemnations of Russian aggressiveness vis-à-vis its neighbors, he sarcastically
notes: ‘American red lines, in short, are firmly placed at Russia’s borders. Therefore Russian ambitions “in its
own neighborhood” violate world order and create crises.’
Likewise, Chomsky accuses US media and politicians of allegedly overreacting to the problem of Russian
meddling in the 2016 elections, calling the issue itself ‘almost a joke.’ He largely refrains from touching upon the
Russian actions themselves, regarding their possible effect as paling compared to the Israeli ‘overwhelming
influence’ which was, in his view, exerted ‘openly, brazenly and with enormous support’ and ‘vastly
overwhelm[ed] anything the Russians may have done.’ Moreover, in his typical manner, Chomsky argues
Washington lacks the moral authority to blame Moscow for an electoral intervention, since the US itself influenced
foreign elections and even established autocracies in the past.
Chomsky persistently contends both Moscow and Washington should start cooperating with each other, believing
such cooperation is needed to stave off a possible destructive war. Yet, as to the accountability for their current
confrontation, Chomsky’s criticism of the two sides is far from equal. Chomsky repeatedly argues—perhaps,
somewhat reasonably—that the roots of the Kremlin’s current anti-Westernism go back to the informal promise not
to expand NATO eastward. That promise was given to Moscow by Washington in 1990 in exchange to
Gorbachev’s ‘astonishing concession to allow a united German to join a hostile military alliance,’ however, the
successive US administrations disregarded it. Conceiving of NATO as an essentially aggressive alliance,
Chomsky deems Russia’s actions vis-à-vis its neighbors an ‘easily understandable,’ expectable and to some
extent sensible response to NATO enlargement. Yet, sometimes he counts the Russian neighbors’ integration
into non-military Western institutions among threats to Moscow too (emphasis mine):
The country of Ukraine is split right now: Western-oriented and Russian-oriented. It’s located on the Russian
border, so there are major security issues for Putin. Ukraine has the only naval base leading to water (the Black
Sea) in Crimea, so from Russia’s point of view, the Ukraine situation is a security threat to them, especially with
NATO moving into Eastern Europe. If the Ukraine joins the EU, then Russia will have hostile relations at their
border.
While Chomsky comments on the international crises involving Russia quite regularly, he hardly ever discusses
domestic Russian issues, even those that are covered negatively by the mainstream Western media, such as gay
rights, elections, political prisoners etc. In one 2006 interview, however, he softly criticized Putin’s internal
policies: ‘Putin is concentrating power in the center’s hands, conducting a policy that is traditional in the Russian
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history and does not inspire admiration’ (my translation and emphasis). Also, in 2019, he wrote a short letter of
support to the Russian political prisoner Azat Miftakhov, a fact noted by a few Russian independent media outlets.
Chomsky’s Inconsistencies
Perhaps the greatest contradiction innate to Chomsky’s perspective on Russia concerns the role of public opinion
in foreign policy decision-making. Chomsky consistently blames the policymakers of the US and its allies for
taking (supposedly) insufficient account of public opinion. Thus, he criticized US involvement in the Vietnam war,
Turkey’s decision to send military troops to Iraq, the US embargo on Cuba and many other actions on the
grounds that they contradicted the then desires of most citizens. Yet, as he once specified, he believes public
opinion should be respected only regarding key foreign policy matters (emphasis mine):
I don’t necessarily agree with the general opinion on everything. For example, roughly half the population of the
United States thinks the world was created ten thousand years ago exactly the way it is now. But that’s really not
the issue for me; the point is that on serious policy issues, there is a tremendous gap between public opinion and
public policy, and public opinion is often quite sound, in my judgment.
In view of this, a problem with Chomsky’s tough opposition to NATO’s eastward enlargement of the
1990s—apparently a serious foreign policy question—is that the enlargement entirely matched public opinion. In
the late 1990s, Americans and Western Europeans as well as Czech, Polish and Hungarian citizens were
supportive of NATO’s expansion that eventually happened in 1999. Remarkably, some research suggests that it
is the then renascent ‘neo-imperialism’ in Russian foreign policy that significantly influenced the desire of these
three countries to join NATO. Chomsky, however, remains insensitive to these facts, leaving one in doubt as to
whether public opinion, in his opinion, is to be considered on all serious policy issues or solely when most citizens
oppose the official goals of the US and its allies.
Likewise, Chomsky keeps portraying the pro-Western aspirations of some post-Soviet states, expressly or
impliedly, as something involuntary and provoked by NATO’s alleged pressure. On the contrary, Moscow’s
responses, as presented by Chomsky, usually appear rational and natural. And again, he ignores public opinion in
the former case, while emphasizing its importance in the latter case. Compare, for example, these quotes of his
(emphases mine)
Georgia was chosen as a corridor by Clinton to bypass Russia and Iran, and was also heavily militarized for the
purpose. Hence Georgia is ‘a very major and strategic asset to us,’ Zbigniew Brzezinski observes.
True, the US has armed Georgia and pressed for admitting it (and Ukraine) into NATO, a very serious provocation
to Russia.
In later years NATO moved further to the east. Now it’s moving to the geopolitical heartland of Russian security
interests, Ukraine. There have been several explicit demands by NATO that Ukraine join NATO. No matter who
was running Russia—even Gandhi—they wouldn’t accept this.
with this one
Putin seems to have been genuinely popular throughout his tenure. Crimeans, it appears, support the takeover by
Russia. There seemed to be possibilities for social democratic developments in Russia after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, possibly even for mutually supportive linkages to social democratic Europe. Such hopes were
dashed by the harsh effects of the US-backed market reforms, which devastated the economy and led to millions
of deaths, along with opening the way for immense corruption as oligarchs took over state assets. Putin was seen
by the public as a corrective to the neoliberal disaster and the decline of Russia on the world scene. Authoritarian
no doubt, often brutal, but, it seems, popular.
Hence, Chomsky largely condones Putin’s foreign policy on the premise that it is popular among Crimeans and
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Russians. Simultaneously, he depicts Georgia’s and Ukraine’s pro-NATO aspirations exclusively in terms of
Washington’s hawkishness which, into the bargain, triggers off Moscow’s malevolence. What he ignores is the
fact that Georgia is a nation with a pronounced European identity, where accession to NATO is a popular idea:
starting from the early 2000s, it has been steadily supported by 60-80% of Georgians. As for Ukrainians, before
2014, they mainly opposed the idea of NATO accession, yet, since the beginning of Russia’s aggression,
supporters of Ukraine’s membership in NATO (40-51% of Ukrainians) have constantly outnumbered its opposers
(25-36%). And in any case, Chomsky’s claim about the ‘explicit demands by NATO that Ukraine join NATO’
(emphasis mine) is too far-reaching to be correct. In fact, not only has the alliance never made such demands, but
also there has always been a strong opposition to the idea of Ukraine’s membership among NATO members.
Contrariwise, on Ukraine’s side, high-level officials, including presidents, have voluntarily voiced their desire to
join the alliance since the early 2000s. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Kiev was expecting to obtain NATO
membership, but the alliance put it on indefinite hold. Notably, both in Georgia and Ukraine, the desires to enter
NATO have been repeatedly expressed since the early 2000s not solely by strongly pro-Western governments,
but also moderate ones.
Chomsky’s analytical inconsistency can be approached from another viewpoint, namely the weight of small
countries in world politics. That Central European countries could not join NATO because this would break the
promise given to Gorbachev or that Ukraine cannot accede to NATO because of being ‘the geopolitical heartland
of Russian security interests’ implies that Chomsky considers it to be somewhat natural and normal for big
powers to decide the fate of small countries. This appears odd given that Chomsky is known as an advocator of a
fairer world order, and seems to reflect a more general contradiction between his ‘analytical realism’ and ‘his
normative commitments with the ideals of classical liberalism,’ which is inherent, according to one study, in his
foreign policy reasoning. Nevertheless, in this respect as well, one can find examples of selectivity in Chomsky’s
reflections. Whereas the voluntariness of Georgia’s US-friendly policies deserves no respect or even mentioning,
US-critical Cuba, in his account, is sympathetically presented as ‘a small country that carries out . . . successful
defiance’ and is consequently ‘subjected to “the terrors of the earth” and a crushing embargo.’
Holding NATO’s expansion responsible for the Ukrainian crisis, Chomsky frequently cites John Mearsheimer’s
article ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault’ in support of this viewpoint. The irony, however, is that for the
prominent ‘offensive’ realist Mearsheimer, presenting world politics as great powers’ business and taking little
interest in public opinion is natural. Chomsky, by contrast, is a thinker renowned for reproaching democratic deficit
and the unfairness of coercion-based international relations. He may be naturally happy to have found a
prominent IR scholar whose specific ideas match his own viewpoint in a specific case—the problem is that those
ideas seem to be largely derived from the basic premises of which Chomsky himself disapproves.
Another discrepancy between Chomsky’s perspectives on Russia and Central/Eastern European states concerns
historical references. Describing Gorbachev’s agreement to the reunification of Germany as extraordinary,
Chomsky notes Moscow had good historical reasons to fear a unified Germany: ‘[t]hey [Russians] lost 25 million
people in the last World War and over 3 million in World War I.’ Analogously, Chomsky treats the presence of
history-based arguments as a factor increasing the validity of the Crimea annexation: ‘Even apart from strong
internal support for the annexation, Crimea is historically Russian; it has Russia’s only warm-water port, the home
of Russia’s fleet; and has enormous strategic significance.’ Against this backdrop, the fact that Chomsky does
not mention that the former members of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have their own (and no less
justified) historical reasons to mistrust Moscow can hardly be explained without alluding to double standards in his
thinking.
Chomsky’s Presentation Style
What distinguishes Chomsky from the majority of Putin’s sympathizers is his carefulness not to overpraise the
Kremlin. Whenever commenting on Russian foreign policy, he often notes—solely in passing, but still—if a certain
move contradicted international rules. Thus, in various interviews, he called Crimea’s takeover ‘not justifiable,’
‘obviously a violation of international law’ and ‘a criminal act.’ Occasionally, he gives negative descriptions to
Putin too, such as ‘[a]uthoritarian no doubt, often brutal’ (see the full quote above) or ‘[h]e’s not a nice guy, I
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don’t want to have dinner with him.’ Yet, there are two issues with Chomsky’s remarks of this kind. First, he
resorts to them mainly if pushed by an assertive interviewer. Second, the criticism of the US and its allies, which
always follows those comments, completely overshadows them both in terms of a number of words and
Chomsky’s emotional input. Therefore, these negative remarks hardly make his opinions appear balanced.
Rather, the impression the reader/listener gets is that Chomsky inserts them for formal reasons, attempting not to
look too supportive of an autocratic leader.
Moreover, unlike other fellow-travelers of the Kremlin, Chomsky underpins his arguments with references to
research publications. However, he repeatedly cites just a handful of them, invariably underlining their high level
and scholarly excellence. Thus, according to Chomsky, Itzkowitz Shifrinson’s article exposing NATO’s lies to
Gorbachev appeared ‘in the prestigious Harvard-MIT journal International Security’; Mearsheimer’s above-
mentioned article was published ‘in the major establishment journal, Foreign Affairs’ and Richard Sakwa’s
book Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, expressing an understanding of the Ukraine crisis akin to that of
Mearsheimer, is an ‘illuminating and judicious scholarly study,’ ‘the most balanced study’ of that crisis (emphases
mine). By giving such descriptions, Chomsky apparently aims to prove his own ideas are not marginal, but
coincide with those of leading IR researchers. Yet, in reality, he carefully selects and compliments a limited
number of publications, that are instrumental for substantiating his own viewpoint, and completely ignores the
main body of IR research on the topic at issue. For instance, most articles, published in the ‘major establishment’
journal Foreign Affairs on Russia, implicitly or explicitly disagree with Mearsheimer’s perspective on Putin’s
foreign policy. Furthermore, the publications Chomsky picks often express rare opinions or have a dubious
reputation among IR scholars. Sakwa’s ‘most balanced study,’ for example, was met with mixed reviews on the
part of academics: some were strongly negative and even moderate ones noted a tendentious presentation of
facts.
Willfully or unwillfully, sometimes Chomsky bases his arguments on frankly inaccurate statements. To illustrate,
during the 2008 war, he wrote that ‘South Ossetia, along with the much more significant region of Abkhazia, were
assigned by Stalin to his native Georgia,’ and then slammed Western leaders for ‘sternly admonish[ing] that
Stalin’s directives must be respected, despite the strong opposition of Ossetians and Abkhazians.’ This reads as
if Abkhazia and South Ossetia are analogous to Crimea that was administratively in Russia before being assigned
to Ukraine in 1954. Yet, in fact, the territory of South Ossetia historically was part of Georgia—before, when and
after Georgia was in the Russian Empire. As for Abkhazia, it was part of independent Georgia in 1918-1921 and a
de facto part of Georgia in 1921-1931, before officially becoming an autonomous region within Georgia.
At times the words Chomsky uses to describe Russian foreign policy appear too radical. This seems to partly
stem from his strong negative emotions about US foreign policy and, perhaps, the possible incompleteness of his
knowledge of Russian politics. To illustrate, on his part, it was certainly an overstatement to say that Putin’s
foreign policy moves are ‘largely interactive’ with NATO’s actions and that ‘[t]here is very little evidence’
pointing to Moscow’s own expansionist aspirations of restoring a strong Soviet-style country. In fact, there is
sufficient research showing that Moscow’s frequent coercive measures, aimed to keep other post-Soviet
countries in its orbit, largely rest on Russia’s own identity traits. Some of those coercive moves are completely
unrelated to NATO. To exemplify, in September 2013, the Kremlin pushed Armenia into joining the Russia-led
Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing an association agreement with the EU, even though Yerevan had
declared no intention whatsoever to join NATO. Simultaneously, the Kremlin launched a wide-ranging political and
media campaign to prevent Kiev from concluding the same agreement, despite that the then Ukrainian
government was not seeking NATO membership either.
Portraying Moscow’s foreign policy assertiveness solely in terms of Washington’s prior actions is typical of
Chomsky’s reasoning, yet, it oversimplifies the complexity of political life. His inclination to explaining Russia’s
switch to anti-Americanism under Putin solely by reference to the US ‘triumphalism’ of the 1990s and the
unsuccessfulness of the market reforms—in which, Chomsky believes, ‘[t]he Clinton programs,’ that ‘were
designed to essentially destroy the Russian economy,’ ‘played a major role in driving Russia to severe economic
and social collapse, with millions of deaths’—neglects intricate domestic processes that brought Russian siloviki
to power in the early 2000s. Similarly, the depiction of Putin’s every anti-Western move as a rational step dictated
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by Russian national interests indirectly overpraises the autocrat’s intellect and disregards the influence of his
personal biases and other psychological features on his foreign policy, scientific accounts of which abound.
Chomsky’s leaning towards giving prominence to the belligerent actions of the US and its allies, while almost
ignoring those of Putin, mirrors his general belief that intellectuals should expose the wrongdoings of their own
countries and not others. To his mind, this springs from the ‘responsibility of the writer as a moral agent is to try to
bring truth about matters of human significance to an audience that can do something about them.’ While such
intentions are unquestionably lofty, nevertheless, adherence to this principle implies an intellectual’s duty to raise
criticism towards other countries too when he/she communicates to foreign audiences. Yet, Chomsky’s 2019
interview for Russia’s state-owned First Channel included no disapproving remarks about Russian political life.
Neither did the Russian editions of his books on international affairs, such as Hegemony or Survival and How the
World Works, include any preface critical of the Russian government.
Conclusions
When discussing Russia-related affairs, Noam Chomsky touches upon a small number of issues and repeatedly
uses the same arguments. Those issues mainly regard the foreign policy matters which have captured the
significant attention of US mainstream politicians and media outlets. Much, if not most, of Chomsky’s reasoning
about Russia usually regards not Russia itself, but the actions of the US and its allies that Chomsky considers to
be worse than those of Russia. All these observations may imply that Russia interests him not per se, but solely to
the extent that references to its actions are useful for corroborating his criticism of the US. In this regard, for
Chomsky, Russia is similar to Iran, Cuba or China, toward which he seems to demonstrate largely the same sort
of sympathetic attitude.
What sets Chomsky apart from many other fellow travelers of the Kremlin is that he tends to use references to IR
scholars and occasionally insert critical remarks about Putin. On the other hand, the most off-putting feature of his
argumentation is his extreme selectiveness concerning the examples he makes, the studies he cites and the
basic premises he applies to foreign policy analysis. Although Chomsky explicitly states he sees his duty in
condemning the unlawful actions of the US specifically, it seems if his stance on autocracies like Russia were
more balanced, his criticism of the US would also look more convincing. Indeed, the commentators blaming
Chomsky for double standards would probably see no problem with, for instance, his interview entitled ‘If you
criticize policy, you are anti-American. That only happens in dictatorships,’ had it not been given to the
dictatorship-backed broadcaster RT.
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